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The term “quantum key distribution” (QKD) impresses laymen and crypto experts alike that it
involves the use of esoteric quantum effects, say of a single optical photon or quantum entangled photons,
which are said to guarantee perfect or almost perfect encryption security [1,2] not possible otherwise.
The following gives a general account on why this has not yet been established and why it may be difficult
to do so.
It is important to observe that a cryptosystem may actually be secure, such as the widely used
AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), without having been proved secure. The lack of security proof
implies that a supposedly secure cryptosystem may one day be found not secure by an “enemy”, apart
from human errors and other practical issues, which happened many times in the past. For a given
mathematical representation of a cryptosystem, security can only be guaranteed by a logical proof. It
cannot be demonstrated by experiments, in contrast to most other issues in science and engineering,
if only because there are an unlimited number of attack possibilities consistent with the mathematical
model that can only be dealt with totally by mathematics and its connections with reality. There is
the additional very serious issue whether the cryptosystem mathematical model captures the real world
situation sufficiently. In fact, many QKD systems have been broken by detector blinding attacks [3]
precisely because the single photon detectors used are not fully represented.
We will not discuss such modeling issues in this paper, and will focus on the foundational difficulties
that QKD encounters in the proof of its information theoretic security, and in particular on what kind of
security with what associated numerical security levels can be obtained. The possibility of such a security
proof is what distinguishes QKD from other cryptosystems, despite its great inefficiency which is mainly
∗This v.2 is a re-writing of v.1 for a broader group of readers. It also contains a few new points.
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due to single photon sources in QKD as compared to > 107 photons in ordinary optical communications.
We begin by a description of the basic security problem of privacy.
Protection of data privacy has become an increasingly important problem area that affects even
our daily lives. A major problem concerns two users Alice and Bob who want to protect their private
communications against an attacker Eve. Such privacy protection is commonly done by some form of
encryption with a cipher that employs a prior shared key bit sequence K known to both of the users.
There are two main issues with this approach. How strong the cipher is against Eve’s eavesdropping
and other more active attacks, and how should K be distributed between the users? If to Eve K is the
uniform random variable U , which has probability 2−n for each of the 2n n-bit sequences K may take
as value, and the bit length of the data sequence X to be transmitted is also n, one can XOR each bit
in the plaintext X with a separate bit in K to form the ciphertext Y , which is called “one-time pad”
encryption. It is “perfectly secure” because while Bob can decrypt X from Y knowing K, Eve can not
learn anything about X from Y . The characteristics of such perfect K = U is that the bit value 0 or 1
occurs with probability 1/2 in each bit and the bits are statistically independent. It has “information
theoretic security” because X remains totally probabilistically uncertain to Eve from her attack, which
may be contrasted with complexity based security in which X cannot be found by Eve only because she
is limited in computational power. The distinguishing character of one-time pad is that it is “perfectly
secure”, its information theoretic security is at the highest possible level. This is because knowing Y
does not help Eve even probabilistically in recovering any bit in X.
The problem of the one-time pad is that the required length of K is far too long in almost all practical
situations. In the usual approach, a cipher that employs a much shorter K than X is used but which
has no provable security. The distribution of such short K is often accomplished by a public key method
which has only complexity based security that may succumb to future technology advances, in contrast
to the information theoretic security of one-time pad, and moreover an additional unproved assumption
is needed to ensure the complexity required for security. These problems are to be solved with QKD by
letting Alice and Bob generate their own long key K which is provably secure and then use it in the
one-time pad form for encryption.
However, it is universally agreed that it is actually not possible to get a perfect key from a QKD
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Figure 1: Quantum Key Distribution, a typical protocol. Two users, Alice and Bob, communicate over
a photon channel and a classical channel to establish a preliminary key, which is then corrected for
error and compressed by privacy amplification (for increasing security level) to generate a final key. The
attacker Eve can intercept both channels.
protocol. In what sense then an imperfect key would guarantee the cryptosystem security?
In the earlier days of QKD the criterion of “accessible information” was used as the quantitative
measure of security, which is Eve’s maximum Shannon mutual information IE between the QKD gener-
ated key K and the observation Eve makes from her attack on the cryptosystem. The K was taken to
be perfectly secure asymptotically when IE goes to zero as the number of bits n in K goes to infinity,
and n becomes the “security parameter” of the cryptosystem, meaning that the security can be made
arbitrarily close to perfect by making the security parameter arbitrarily large.
The key question that has not been fully resolved to date is the following. Given a security criterion
Sc such as IE that is equal to 0 for perfect security, what is the security guarantee when Sc > 0 is at some
quantitative value? On the other hand, enough has been found about two common criteria, the IE above
and the trace distance criterion d to be discussed, that some serious problems on security guarantee can
be pinpointed.
Generally, in an attack Eve could obtain a probability distribution P (K) on the possible values of K,
and the quality of an imperfect K needs to be assessed by comparing P (K) to the uniform distribution
U . Any security criterion Sc consisting of a single number does not capture the full distribution function
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P (K), the details of which relate to various possible security breaches. One most important security
measure from P (K) is p1, Eve’s maximum probability of identifying the whole K from her attack. Clearly
p1 has to be sufficiently small. Once p1 is brought into the security picture, it becomes evident [4] it
is the rate that IE goes to 0, not the fact that it does, which determines quantitative security level at
any key generation rate. It turns out there is always a tradeoff between security level and key rate, with
lower security for higher key rate, and there is no security parameter in QKD with which the security
level can be driven to perfect [4, 5].
In this connection, it is important to note that the various entropies and mutual information are not
operational quantities and may become misleading. “Information” here is a technical term with different
meaning from its daily usage, as Shannon himself emphasized in the 1950’s. In ordinary communications,
their operational meaning is given by relating them to the empirical data rate and error rate through the
Shannon coding theorems. In cryptography the operational meaning of various criteria Sc were spelled
out in part only recently [4,5].
It turns out that accessible information is not a good quantitative security criterion in QKD due to
the phenomenon of quantum information locking, and it has been replaced by a quantum trace distance
criterion d [1, 2] by the majority of QKD groups. We do not need to be concerned with the detailed
definition or technical situation for the purpose of this paper, and may just note that 0 ≤ d ≤ 1 and the
smaller d is the closer it is to the ideal d = 0 case. There are several problems associated with d and its
use in QKD protocols.
(1) The trace distance criterion d is commonly interpreted as the maximum “failure probability” of
the QKD system, “failure” meaning the system is not “ideal” [1,2]. A key from a system not ideal is also
imperfect. Thus d is taken to be the (maximum) probability that the key is not perfect, not being U to
Eve. It turns out that under a d guarantee, p1 can be as large as d + 2
−n for an n-bit K [4], meaning
the whole K may be revealed to Eve with a probability (slightly bigger than) d. A 1,000 bit perfect K
would give probability 2−1,000 for p1, while the best value in theory [6] has d > 2−50. This is hundreds
of orders of magnitude away from a perfect key. Experimentally d ∼ 10−9 for a 105 bits K [7] and the
gap from perfect is even more enormous.
This interpretation is actually incorrect [4,5,8], and the probability of K being imperfect is 1, not d.
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However, bounds on Eve’s average probability of successfully estimating various portions of K can be
obtained [5] in terms of d. The implications of this error are discussed in the following points (2)-(5).
(2) The d guarantee obtained for QKD protocols is an average value over the very large number of
possible privacy amplification codes used in generating K. (“Privacy amplification” involves compressing
or “hashing” a number of given bits into a smaller number for increasing the security level, which is a
necessary step in QKD protocols.) For product guarantee one does not use average guarantee but uses
probability guarantee, which can be obtained from average for the unknown P (K) through the use of
Markov inequality. The necessity of such conversion is easily seen from the (artificial) example of a
cryptosystem which has 50/50 chance of being secure for 100 years or totally insecure, with an average
of 50 years of security. When a single average guarantee over privacy amplification is converted into
probability guarantee, the minimum “failure probability” is increased from d to d1/2. In addition, such
privacy amplification guarantee requires a p1 guarantee on the hashing input bits. Only averaged p1
over Eve’s possible attack measurement results is prescribed in security proofs. To remove such average,
Markov inequality needs to be used also for a different random quantity. The minimum failure probability
that can be obtained then becomes ∼ d1/3 [5].
In addition to ciphertext-only attack in which Eve knows only the ciphertext, Eve may launch a
known-plaintext attack [9] when the generated K is used for one-time pad encryption, in which Eve also
knows some bits in the plaintext X. Since the whole ciphertext Y is always taken to be open, Eve would
know the corresponding bits in K. For one-time pad encryption this does not help her to get other
unknown bits in X she doesn’t know, because the bits in K are independent. However, for an imperfect
K there may be correlation among its bits that would let Eve learn about the other bits in K, and hence
the other bits in X through Y . It is easy to construct specific example in which knowing some specific
m bits of X would reveal all the rest of X with probability 1 from such attack, however long X may be,
when d = 2−m. This, incidentally, is a specific counter-example to the failure probability interpretation
of d. There is an average guarantee over the known bits of X in terms of d. After this additional average
is also removed, the correct failure probability guarantee becomes d1/4 [5].
(3) From point (2) above the numerical values of the probability guarantee get much worse than even
those of point (1). The theoretical and experimental values become d ∼ 10−3.5 and d ∼ 10−2.3. They are
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clearly not meaningful security guarantee for even a single QKD round. Typically 10 QKD rounds are
carried out in a sec, and thus ∼ 106 rounds per day. When the d value as failure probability is converted
to a daily rate, the possibility of Eve totally breaking about 103 rounds per day is not ruled out by the
security guarantee.
If a probability of 10−15 for a single trial is to be considered practically impossible and there are
just 105 QKD rounds total to be carried out, d would need to be 10−80 for the effective d1/4 probability
to be 10−20 needed for security guarantee against known-plaintext attack, and d = 10−60 is needed
for ciphertext-only attack. Compare this to the best theory value of 10−14. It may be mentioned
that for a ciphertext-only attack the obtainable QKD security level is quite unfavorable compared to
the information theoretic security that can be obtained from symmetric key expansion in conventional
cryptography [8]. The latter has, however, no information theoretic security against know-plaintext
attack.
(4) When Eve makes an error in estimating K or one of its subsets, she may nevertheless get many
bits correctly since one bit error already makes the whole sequence in error. This is the analog of the
“bit error rate” issue in communications, which is different from “sequence error rate”. For a perfect key
the guarantee remains perfect, but under a d guarantee it is not yet quantified. Similar deviation from
an imperfect key may allow “distinguishing attack” [9] that has not yet been discovered.
(5) Quantification of security with error correction, which is a necessary step in QKD with small
energy signals, is an almost insurmountable problem. For a given error correction procedure, it is not
possible to rigorously estimate how many errors Eve could correct with what probability, from her
knowledge of any publicly announced error correction procedure. Error correcting codes are notorious
for their capability of correcting many more errors than those theoretically predicted. No justification
has been given for the widely used leakEC formula for such information leak to Eve [5]. Even if the parity
check digits of a linear error correcting code are covered by true one-time pad, there is still the leak of
code structural information. And with an imperfect key used to cover such digits the resulting security
level is uncertain, especially at the relatively large d levels that can be obtained. The seriousness of the
problem can be seen from the use of imperfect key in message authentication, in which the tag length
security parameter is lost due to the imperfect key [5].
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The foundational consideration pointed out in this paper applies to all QKD protocols, including the
recent measurement-device-independent approach. It shows that adequate security for QKD protocols
has not yet been obtained just in theory, and it does not seem possible to obtain it without some new
ingredient and further research. There are also many other approach specific security problems that
have not been resolved [10]. The trace distance criterion is further formally treated recently [11], with no
mention of any of the long standing difficulties indicated in this paper which are not resolved as before.
We end this note by quoting [9, p19] that it is important to “...realize that security is incredibly subtle
and that it is very easy to overlook critical weaknesses.”
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